Reason and Heart: A Dialogue on Thinking and Feeling
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14295/idonline.v20i83.4513Keywords:
Reason, Thinking, Feeling, Walter ScottAbstract
This article examines the historical dichotomy between cognition and affectivity, traditionally viewed as antagonistic dimensions of psychological functioning. Challenging the classical perspective—exemplified by Walter Scott’s statement regarding the incompatibility of love and reason—the author argues that thought and feeling are inseparable, understanding them as complementary parts of the same psychological process. In the theoretical discussion, cognition is defined as the mental process of acquiring and interpreting knowledge, while affectivity is presented as the set of emotions (biological reactions) and feelings (subjective value attributions assigned to emotions). The text emphasizes that affective states directly influence the perception and interpretation of reality, lending meaning and value to human experiences. This analysis is supported by empirical observations from individual and group sessions at a Social Assistance Reference Center (CRAS) in Itatiba, São Paulo, where it was found that emotional states of sadness and hopelessness significantly alter the users' psychological functioning. In this context, attentive listening enables a cognitive-affective reinterpretation of lived experiences, fostering the return of positive feelings and self-esteem. The article concludes that cognition and affectivity should not be understood as separate entities but as integrated dimensions that structure human experience, forming a cognitive-affective unity that guides both thinking and feeling.
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SCOTT, Walter. Ivanhoe. São Paulo: Martin Claret, 2002.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Fausto Eduardo Menon Pinto

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