Efficiency or Economicism? A Critical Analysis of the Adoption of the Lowest Price Criterion in Brazilian Public Procurement

Abstract

This article critically analyzes the adoption of the lowest-price criterion as a structuring public policy for public procurement and contracting in Brazil, considering a temporal scope of the last thirty years. The study focuses on the application of this criterion in bidding procedures, especially in electronic and in-person auctions, in light of the provisions of Laws No. 8,666/1993, No. 10,520/2002, and No. 14,133/2021. Methodologically, the research adopts a qualitative approach of an analytical-critical nature, grounded in normative and documentary analysis, supported by selected case studies. The investigation engages with the constitutional principles of efficiency, equality, and competitiveness, questioning the predominance of the lowest-price criterion as an undifferentiated decision-making parameter for both high- and low-value contracts. Furthermore, the study examines structural asymmetries among Brazilian municipalities—particularly small-sized municipalities marked by technological, organizational, and human resource constraints—and their impact on the uniform application of public procurement legislation. The findings indicate that the uncritical adoption of the lowest-price criterion tends to reinforce economistic practices, undermining a broader conception of administrative efficiency and the quality of public spending.